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BOOK REVIEW
(CRWE TRENDS IN PUBLIC HOUSING
RALPH TAYLOR
SUSANJ. POPKIN, VICToRIA E. GWLAsDA, LYNN M. OLSON, DENNIS
P. ROsENBAUM, & LARRY BURON, THE HIDDEN WAR: CRIME AND
THE TRAGEDY OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO.
Rutgers University Press 2000. 256 pp.
The Hidden War provides a post mortem on one of the most
expensive if not one of the grandest urban social experiments to
have ever failed in this country: high-rise public housing com-
munities. Begun on a large scale in the 1950s, subjected to nu-
merous policy shifts that redefined eligible tenants from about
1960 onwards, criticized architecturally from the 1960s on by
Rainwater, Newman and others, managed by local housing
authorities subjected to urban political cross-currents, and
overseen and sometimes funded by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, these communities are coming down
all across the country as rent vouchers, scattered site housing,
section 8 (assisted) housing and low-rise, partially-public hous-
ing communities take their place. The dynamiting of Pruitt-
Igoe in St Louis at the end of the 1960s, widely photographed be-
cause it was one of the first uses of the timed implosion demoli-
tion technique, not because of the surrounding social
controversy, has been bookended by a 1990s Homicide: Life on the
Street episode where a police officer witnesses the demolition of
the high-rise Baltimore public housing community where he
grew up. In the same way that social reformers in the 1950s
hoped that clearing "slum" housing and moving residents to
well-managed, new high-rise living accommodations would re-
sult in drastically improved quality of life, reformers two genera-
' See SUSANJ. POPKIN ET. AL, THE HIDDEN WAR: CRIME AND THE TRAGEDY OF PUBUC
HOUSING IN CHICAGO (2000).
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tions later hope that low-rise developments, rent vouchers, and
scattered-site housing will be the safe haven or at least a new
and better beginning for residents of high-rise public housing
communities. The implications of this book will give them
pause in their speculations. If people in later generations want
to know how bad conditions were for residents in those high-
rises at the end of the millennium, and to get some insight into
the policy, social, cultural, and economic factors that led to
these deplorable conditions, The Hidden War will provide the
case study descriptions and some explanation. This book is for
anyone who doubts the unforgivably high costs of segregation
and hyper-segregation.
The volume describes the results of a multi-method, longi-
tudinal study carried out in three Chicago public housing
communities, namely, Rockwell Gardens, Harold Ickes, and
Henry Homer, from the early 1990s through the late 1990S.2 A
multi-institutional research team led by Susan Popkin (Abt-
Chicago, now with the Urban Institute) surveyed residents
repeatedly, carried out in-depth, key-person interviews,
compiled information from local newspapers and other sources,
and for a few months had a trained ethnographer visiting the
locations.3 Repeated surveys spanned 1994 to 1997, with various
follow-up information on some topics included up to mid-
1999. 4 The data on which the volume rests is extremely strong
because it is multi-wave, it is multi-method, and it was carried
out by researchers who were able to negotiate successfully some
of the most dangerous settings imaginable in the United States
at the time. Hopefully the newspaper archive and the
ethnographic results will be archived, along with the repeated
surveys, so that future researchers can benefit more fully from
these powerful data.
Chapter One introduces the overall scope of the study, its
purposes, and some of the themes the authors develop later.
The authors' stated purpose is as follows:
We tell the story of the CHA's [Chicago Housing Authority's] strug-
gle against crime in its developments presented through the eyes of the
residents who suffered through life in these communities. The stories in
the book poignantly document the tremendous toll that violence has
2 See id. at 191-98 (describing the methodology used in the book).
3 See id. at 5-6.
' See id.
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taken on these individuals and the ways in which gang-dominated social
order has undermined any efforts to improve conditions.
In Chapter One, the authors also start to introduce some of the
"lessons learned" from their investigation, and they explain why
they decided to "tell this story as a series of three comprehensive
case studies."6 The reasons are so that readers would under-
stand daily life in these communities, to pinpoint the factors
that prevented programs launched there from having positive
impacts, and to explore "how variations in the level of social or-
ganization" influenced program outcomes
Chapter Two provides a thumbnail history of the CHA over
the last fifty years and the broader, political, legal and policy
contexts affecting the authority.8 Specific agency leaders, their
connections to local reform or political bosses or both, and the
nationally shifting legal and policy arenas are recounted. 9 Par-
ticularly relevant for the study site in the 1990s was the Vincent
Lane administration at CHA and his focus on combating drugs
and crime, the "war ... costing the CHA more than $78 million
each year" by the mid 1990s." Funds for those efforts were di-
verted from maintenance and operating categories within the
CHA budget." Widespread warrantless searches also were initi-
ated, receiving media and legal attention.1
2
Chapter Three provides details on the crime fighting efforts
in Chicago's public housing. 3 The efforts mounted were com-
plex, drawing on several different enforcement agencies, includ-
ing the City of Chicago Police Department, a newly created
housing authority police, and private security. 4 The law en-
forcement efforts initiated were complemented by more meager
"service and maintenance components [that] were curtailed,"
and social services, particularly drug treatment and ,prevention
programs housed in centers within the communities.
-'d. at 3.
6 Id at 4.
7 Id. at 5.
8 See id at 10-23.
9 See id.
Id at 17.
"See id. at 17-18.
2 See id& at 18.
's See idL at 24-38.
'14 See id&
" Id at 32.
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Chapters Four through Six detail the events taking place in
each of the three communities.'6 Each chapter starts with at
least a couple of heart-wrenching stories about particular resi-
dents, using extensive quotes from the interviews to convey the
residents' perspectives.' Each case study includes information
on the immediate community context, gang developments,
resident initiatives, treatment activities, and results over time
from the surveys displaying residents' perceptions of physical
incivilities, drugs and gang activity, and violence. 8
Chapter Seven closes with more general thoughts on lessons
learned and questions about the future. 9 The lessons learned
include that there are "no simple solutions" (the chapter tile),
that law-abiding residents must live in close relationships with
large numbers of active, violent gang members with whom they
share numerous social ties, that some of the best-designed
community crime prevention programs failed miserably, that
massive amounts of comprehensive, on-site social services are
needed to overcome the economic, social and physical isolation
experienced by these families, linked to a model of "transitional
case management services" such as maintained for welfare-to-
work transition households.0
The Hidden War is valuable solely for the descriptions pro-
vided in the three case study chapters.2 ' To be able to track the
policy changes, crime changes, gang changes, enforcement
shifts and variations in residents' reactions and views over a
multi-year period is valuable documentation. Because these
thick descriptions are based on more than just in-depth inter-
views, they provide a more complete picture than would a
stand-alone series of lengthy interviews.
But the value of the volume runs deeper. It provides a
number of "take away" lessons, not all of which the researchers'
themselves highlight. Here is my list, in order of descending
importance. First, relocation to scattered-site or low-rise public
housing communities may solve some problems, but only par-
16 See id at 39-173.
17 See id at 39-45, 85-91, 138-42.
18 See id 39-173.
'9 See id at 174-90.
' Id at 187-90. The volume concludes with a brief appendix on research methods,
a bibliography, and a detailed index.
2 See id at 39-173.
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tially, at the same time that it creates others. For example, one
interviewee, Clarice, reported that her new townhome neigh-
borhood was dangerous and gang-dominated, and she felt more
socially isolated than before because her new neighbors ignored
her once they learned she was not Puerto Rican. Second, the
variations over time in quality of life in the high-rise communi-
ties were driven solely by the current state of inter-gang con-
flicts over drug territories. If a "peace" was in place, residents
perceived fewer problems and less violence. If "war" broke out,
problems worsened and residents literally ducked as they went
about their business. Gang dynamics dominated buildings, and
inter-gang relations-not programs or security coverage-were
the major determinant of quality of life.2 Gang dominance and
residents' accompanying fear of retaliation if they were to re-
port anything led even to unreported dead bodies in the stair-
wells for several hours, even though seen by tenants. ' Third,
and perhaps most miraculously, it was possible, even under
these extreme circumstances, for residents to make progress if
specific setting conditions coalesced. The success of the
Monroe Street site in Rockwell Gardens was a case-in-point-2 5 A
charismatic local leader, a favorable building position making it
of less strategic interest to warring gangs, and resident initiatives
that for a time coincided with CHA preferences resulted in
modest success for a period."6 Active tenant patrols in the Har-
old Ickes Homes were somewhat effective because they were
complemented by twenty-four hour security forces!7 But then
CHA decided to cut that expense, given other pressing needs,
and the tenant patrols diminished their active patrols because
they were so much more vulnerable.2 Residents could achieve
some building-by-building success but it was extremely fragile.2
Finally, one way to reduce violence was to negotiate with gang
leaders.Y Leaders at the service delivery center in the Harold
Ickes site negotiated with gang leaders, worked out commit-
2See id at 136.
2'Seeid at 69.
' See id. at 149.
2Seeid at81.
2 See id
2See id at 157.
"See id at 161.
2 See id
sSee id at 162.
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ments, and violence lessened.3 ' But other local leaders then
criticized such efforts arguing that there should be no negotia-
tion with gang leaders. 2
Turning to theory, I think there are take-away lessons as
well, but I disagree with the authors on what those are. They
suggest that even some of the soundest, backed-up-by-the-lat-
est-social-science-findings community crime-prevention pro-
grams failed.33 The mistake the authors make, because they
ignore important theoretical analyses of community crime pre-
vention dating back to the early 1980s, is in assuming that a
crime control strategy relying on resident-police co-production
of safety is the most strongly empirically supported type of pro-
gram. Community crime-prevention programs fall generally
into two classes: crime control and social problem reduction.
Pioneering work by Aaron Podolefsky and Fred DuBow, based
on the Northwestern University Reactions to Crime Project of
1975-1980,"4 (confirmed again almost twenty years later by
qualitative interviews of Baltimore neighborhood leaders in the
1990s) 3 strongly suggests that prevention programs heavily
geared to law enforcement will fail in low-income communities
dominated by populations of color, as shown by Popkin and her
colleagues. Podolefsky and DuBow's theoretical analysis sug-
gests the only effective programs, such as were implemented in
the service centers located in the high-rise communities, will be
those based on addressing the social problems concomitant with
the violence-substance abuse problems, teen and youth em-
ployment, recreation, education opportunities, and broader in-
frastructural development.36 In short, in my eyes, part of the
reason the prevention programs failed is because they over-
looked what good social science told us almost twenty years ago
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 176.
3' Fred DuBow and Aaron Podolefsky, Citizen Participation in Community Crime Pre-
vention, 41 HUMAN ORG. 307, 307-314 (1982); FRED DuBow AND DAVID EMMONS, The
Community Hypothesis, in REACTIONS TO CRIME, 167, 167-81 (Dan A. Lewis ed. 1981);
AARON PODOLEFStY, CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION (1983); AARON
PODOLEFSKY AND FRED DuBow, STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION:
COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO CRIME IN URBAN AMERICA (1981).
3' RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE EVIDENCE
AND THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR AND DECLINE 303-363 (2000)
3m See id at 290-94.
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about the connections between community fabric, views about
crime, type of program, and success. In their defense, Popkin
and her colleagues are not the only ones who overlook the pio-
neering work of Podolefsky and DuBow.
There are two more far more minor points of theoretical
disagreement. One centers on issues of zero-tolerance polic-
ing; policies the authors endorse as generally effective, 7 but to
date have not yet been shown to be effective.m Another has to
do with their dismissal of situational crime prevention as a tech-
nique that, because it causes displacement, will not be effec-
tive."9 This statement overlooks recent work showing that
displacement is not 1:1, and that there can be diffusion of bene-
fits as well as displacement.
40
Finally, I think there are a couple of take-away theoretical
lessons the researchers have overlooked. Work on the incivili-
ties thesis shows that indicators of physical and social disorder
may not join together as strongly as they should were they
driven by an underlying disorder dynamic.' Stated differently,
when researchers and policy analysts use terms like "disorder"
and "incivilities" they may think they are referring to a unitary
set of dynamics. But if different incivilities indicators change in
different ways over time, then there is no underlying disorder or
incivilities, but instead a set of relatively distinct and only loosely
constellated problems. Popkin et. al. report:
By 1998, at least on the exterior, Homer was much cleaner than in
May 1994. Indeed, given all the changes, it is surprising that residents'
complaints about trash and graffiti outside did not decline more-even
in December, 1997, nearly half the residents .. .still reported major
problems with graffiti and with trash in the parking lots and laivns. This
finding suggests that despite the reduced disorder, vandalism remained
a serious problem. 42
' See PoPmN Er. AL, supra note 1, at 29.
SeeTAYLOR, supra note 35, at 372.
See id. at 29.
See GARY S. BARNES, Defining and Optimizing Displacement, in CMIME AND PLACE 95,
95-114 (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds. 1995).
" Ralph B. Taylor, The Incvilities Thesis: Thaoy, Measurement and Polify, rn
MEASURING WHAT MATrERS, 65, 65-88 (R. L. Langworthy ed.); see also TAs1OR, supra
note 35, at 93-131.
' PoPK N ET. AL, supra note 1, at 124.
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This lack of congruence has surfaced as well in work on changes
in Baltimore neighborhoods over a twelve-year period." To
find the same divergence in a more homogeneous set of com-
munities over a shorter time, as did Popkin, deepens the ques-
tions I already have about the disorder construct.
Despite all that this volume accomplishes, it is hard not to
wish for more. Highest on my wish list is further contextualiz-
ing. Some maps showing community locations in the City of
Chicago, with detailed maps showing building locations within
each community, would have been nice. Historical census data
showing the changing populations in these communities would
have been helpful as well.
Speaking of context, The Hidden War will doubtless be com-
pared closely to two other volumes on life in public housing
communities that also appeared in 2000. The three make an in-
teresting contrast in method and perspective. Dalton Conley's
Honky is a memoir of growing up the son of bohemian parents
in a predominantly African-American public housing commu-
nity in New York City in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s." Conley's
memoir paints far more vivid pictures of the residents of his
childhood, and dwells at more length on issues of race and
class. Almost literally across the street from one of the commu-
nities assessed by Popkin and her colleagues, Sudhir Alladi
Venkatesh was conducting ethnographic work for ten years in
the Robert Taylor Homes, perhaps the most violence-plagued
of Chicago's public housing communities, and has written about
the results in American Project.4" There are numerous points of
overlap between Venkatesh and Popkin's accounts: residents'
heroic efforts to organize and improve their lives, the difficulties
of negotiating relationships with gang members, and the golicy
initiatives that confound progress seemingly at every turn. But
there are important differences too. Venkatesh's account, for
example, provides a more sociologically grounded and nuanced
discussion of the rise of gangs in these communities. He argues
"' See TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 93-131.
14 DALTON CONLEY, HONEY (2000).
SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN
GHETrO (2000).
46 See id. at 130-31 (describing, for instance, tenant leaders difficulty negotiating
with gangmembers); see also PoPrUN ET. AL, supra note 1, at 162 (describing similar
controversies related to tenant negotiations with gangs).
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the street gang became part of the local social organization be-
cause of shrinking resources flowing to the traditional power
structure-the tenant councils-and strong suspicions and dis-
trust of police. 7 Which volume people prefer may be in part a
matter of style. Some may find that the multi-method, more
quantitatively grounded approach of Popkin's team may be a
more reassuring edifice upon which to mount the lesson plan
when we review public housing communities.
The Hidden War should prove of interest in advanced under-
graduate classes and graduate classes in a number of disciplines
including sociology (urban sociology, communities and crime),
political science (urban policies, housing), criminal justice (pol-
icy analysis, community crime prevention), and urban studies
(housing, social policy). Since it does not rely heavily on quan-
titative data presentation it should be accessible to students with
a range of backgrounds.
' See Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Social Organization of Street Gang Activity M an Ur-
ban Ghetto, 25 AIMR.J. OFSOC. 103, 82-111 (1997).
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